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COMMENTARIES
RIGHT TO DIE, FORCED TO LIVE: CRUZAN V.
DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH
On January 11, 1983, an automobile accident in Jasper County, Missouri,
rendered Nancy Beth Cruzan incompetent. Deprived of oxygen for twelve
to fourteen minutes, Ms. Cruzan sustained probable cerebral contusions
compounded by significant anoxia (lack of oxygen). Ms. Cruzan entered a
comatose state and remained unconscious. With the consent of her husband,
surgeons implanted a gastrostomy feeding tube to facilitate and maintain
nutrition in order to further her recovery. Nevertheless, rehabilitative efforts
were unsuccessful,1 and Ms. Cruzan entered a persistent vegetative state.2
On December 14, 1990, after a prolonged legal battle, a Missouri trial court
granted Ms. Cruzan's parents' request for the termination of treatment.
1. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1990).
2. Id.
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its inter-
nal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary ven-
tilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and
nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of
either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987). "Vegetative state patients may react
reflexively to sounds, movements and normally painful stimuli, but they do not feel any pain or
sense anybody or anything. Vegetative state patients may appear awake but are completely
unaware." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted).
By one estimate, Ms. Cruzan could have lived for an additional thirty years. Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). In her vegetative state, Ms. Cruzan suffered from
bleeding gums, vomiting, seizures, and diarrhea. Gladwell, Woman in Right-to-Die Case Suc-
cumbs: Cruzan Was in Coma for Eight Years; Court Ruling Allowed Tube Removal, Wash.
Post, Dec. 27, 1990, at A3, col. 1 [hereinafter Gladwell]. Missouri paid Ms. Cruzan's medical
costs, which were approximately $130,000 per month. Okie, Medical Groups Criticize Court
for Interfering in Life-or-Death Decisions, Wash. Post, June 26, 1990, at Al, col. 5.
3. Gladwell, Court Rules Woman Has Right to Die: Cruzan Case Leaves Unresolved Is-
sues, Legal Experts Say, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 1. Missouri officials did not
challenge the court order, which was issued after three of Ms. Cruzan's friends testified in
August 1990 that Ms. Cruzan said in conversations with them that she would never want to
live "like a vegetable." Id. at A10, col. 2.
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Thereafter, the hospital ceased to administer water and her liquid diet;4 Ms.
Cruzan died twelve days later.5
I.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,6 the United States
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the controversial issue of a pa-
tient's right to die. While the Court found that a competent patient has a
liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment, it differentiated the exer-
cise of that right by a competent patient from that by an incompetent pa-
tient. Since an incompetent patient cannot truly give informed consent in
the absence of a living will, the Court held that Missouri's interest in the
protection of life permitted it to "apply a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hy-
dration of a person diagnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state.",
7
Without court approval, hospital employees had refused the request of
Ms. Cruzan's parents to remove their daughter's nutrition tube.8 Conse-
quently, her parents and co-guardians, Lester and Joyce Cruzan, sought a
court order requiring removal. A Missouri trial court concluded that Ms.
Cruzan had a "fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions
to refuse or direct the withdrawal of 'death prolonging procedures.' "' Since
she had previously expressed her desire not to survive if she could not live
"at least halfway normally," the trial court ordered the removal. 10
The Missouri Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial court by a di-
vided vote. 1' The court found that Missouri had a strong state policy favor-
ing the preservation of life' 2 and was reluctant to apply the doctrine of
informed consent to an incompetent patient who did not have a living will.
4. Id. at Al, col. 1. Doctors administered pain medication, and medical experts pre-
dicted she would starve and dehydrate to death within two weeks.
5. Gladwell, supra note 2, at A3, col. I ("She remained peaceful throughout and showed
no sign of discomfort or distress in any way." (quoting family statement)).
6. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
7. Id. at 2854. At the United States Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference on
September 14-15, 1990, Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan suggested that the
Supreme Court simply upheld Missouri's rule. It did not approve, require, or endorse the use
of the higher evidentiary standard, and it did not affect states that either recognize a broader
right to die or have decided similar cases differently. See Constitutional Law Conference, 59
U.S.L.W. 2272, 2275 (1990) [hereinafter Law Conference].
8. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub noma. Cruzan
v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
12. Id. at 426.
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Although Ms. Cruzan's prior statements persuaded the trial court, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court concluded that the statements were unreliable to deter-
mine her intent 3 and thus failed to satisfy the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard the court established for that purpose.' 4
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court
decision. 5 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist traced the de-
velopment of state right-to-die cases, observing that "most courts have based
a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common law right to in-
formed consent or on both the common law right and a constitutional pri-
vacy right."' 6 After emphasizing that the Court's review was limited to the
constitutional issue, the majority concluded that a protected liberty interest
to refuse medical treatment exists under the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution. "[F]or purposes of this case," the Court assumed that "a com-
petent person [has] a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hy-
dration and nutrition." '7
Even while acknowledging that a patient has a protected liberty interest to
refuse treatment, the Court dismissed the principle applied by many state
courts that the right of privacy includes a right to refuse treatment. Rather,
the Court stated that the "issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."'1
8
13. Id. at 424.
14. Id. at 425.
15. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
16. Id. at 2847. There are two views regarding the termination of hydration and nutri-
tion. One view concludes that food and water constitute medical care, and thus a patient has a
right to refuse them as medical treatment. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371-72
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 435-39, 497
N.E.2d 626, 636-38 (1987); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-75, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235-36 (1985).
The other view concludes that food and water are basic human needs that cannot be refused.
See, e.g., Derr, Nutrition and Hydration As Elective Therapy: Brophy and Jobes from an Ethical
and Historical Perspective, 2 IssuEs L. & MED. 25, 38 (1986).
17. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. The most significant aspect of the Cruzan decision may be
that five justices gave substantive constitutional protection to the right to die. While Chief
Justice Rehnquist only assumed that such a right exists, Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion was more explicit, saying that "the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical treat-
ment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Thus, including her among the four dissenting justices, a majority of the Court
supported a constitutional right to die. While the departure of Justice Brennan leaves this
majority status in doubt, the views of these four justices will certainly influence future deci-
sions in this area. See Law Conference, supra note 7, at 2272.
18. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7. But see In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647,
663 (1976) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)) ("Presumably this right [of privacy]
is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
1991]
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Since the right to refuse treatment implicated a liberty interest under the
due process clause, and not a privacy right, the Court balanced Ms. Cruzan's
liberty interests against the State's interest in the preservation of life to deter-
mine whether a constitutional violation had occurred.' 9 Addressing Ms.
Cruzan's interest, the Court determined that "an incompetent person is not
able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical
right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a 'right' must be exercised
.... if at all, by some sort of surrogate."2  Consequently, Missouri could
erect a clear and convincing evidentiary standard as a "procedural safeguard
to assure that the action of the surrogate conforms as best it may to the
wishes expressed by the patient while competent."'" Thus, while Ms.
Cruzan retained her liberty interest even though she was incompetent, Mis-
souri could qualify procedurally the exercise of that right.
In discussing the state interests, the Court supported Missouri's "interest
in the protection and preservation of human life."' 22 To emphasize the sig-
nificance of this interest, the Court identified both the treatment of homicide
as a "serious crime" as well as the criminalization of assisting suicide. More-
over, the finality of the decision to terminate treatment and the danger of its
potential abuse by self-interested surrogates made this interest even more
significant.23
circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.").
19. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982)).
20. Id. at 2852.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2852-53. Identifying the preservation of life as a state interest assumes that the
termination of treatment, rather than the underlying illness, would be the primary cause of
death. This view is not universal. See In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, -, 558 N.E.2d
1194, 1201 (1990) (citation omitted) ("When, as result of incurable illness, a patient cannot
chew or swallow and a death-delaying feeding tube is withdrawn in scrupulous accordance
with the law, the ultimate agent of death is the illness and not the withdrawal."); In re Estate
of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 42, 549 N.E.2d 292, 296 (1989) ("Termination of [nasogastric
tubes, gastrostomies, or intravenous infusions does] not deprive the patient of life; rather, the
inability of the patient to chew or swallow, as a result of his illness, is viewed as the ultimate
agent of death.").
The Court did not, however, include the economic costs to the State of Ms. Cruzan's care in
its discussion of state interests. While the majority could have argued that the value of human
life cannot be assigned a dollar value, the economic reality of federal and state fiscal con-
straints suggests that such costs should at least be considered, especially when a patient's
choice is not clearly ascertainable. See Smith, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal
Dilemmas in Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1987); Okie, supra
note 2, at Al, col. 5.
23. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852; see also Longeway, 133 Il. 2d at 44, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
The Longeway court identified four countervailing State interests: the preservation of life; the
protection of the interests of innocent third parties; the prevention of suicide; and maintenance
of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id.
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Since the interests before the Court were "more substantial, both on an
individual and societal level, than those involved in a run-of-the-mine civil
dispute,"2 4 the Court held that Missouri was justified in its adoption of a
clear and convincing standard of proof to determine an incompetent pa-
tient's intent to terminate treatment. In addition to the substantial interests
involved, there were other reasons for the heightened standard. It reflected a
societal judgment about who should bear the risk of an erroneous decision.
An erroneous decision not to terminate treatment maintains the status quo
and preserves the opportunity to take advantage of advances in medical
technology 25 or to find additional evidence of intent. However, an erroneous
decision to withdraw feeding and hydration is "final and irrevocable.",
26
While the "dramatic consequences" of termination influenced the balance
of interests,2 the Court refused to consider Ms. Cruzan's quality of life.28
Rather, a state could "simply assert an unqualified interest in the preserva-
tion of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected inter-
ests of the individual."2 9 The patient's quality of life was therefore not
24. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854.
25. Id. But see id. at 2873 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (" 'The discovery of new evidence'...
is more hypothetical than plausible, [and in any event] . . . it is a part of the patient's
calculus.") (quoting majority op., 110 S. Ct. at 2854) (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 2854. In addition, the rationale underlying the parole evidence rule, requiring
parties to formalize intent in writing, supported the heightened standard. Id.
One effect of Cruzan is that it promotes the formalization of intent.
The legacy of Cruzan is that ... it gave a boost to living wills. It gave a boost to the
idea that the stopping of treatment should be discussed before someone becomes in-
competent or impaired and made doctors and nurses more attentive to the idea that
the tubes they put in could also be removed.
Gladwell, supra note 2, at A3, col. 1.
27. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
28. By refusing to address the quality of life for someone in Ms. Cruzan's position, the
Court took a simplistic, uncritical, and unsatisfying approach to this complex medical, legal,
and ethical issue. While the Court's review is limited by the Constitution, it does not follow
that such an inquiry would not inform the constitutional answer or, especially, the exercise of
this constitutional right. While the Court erred on the side of Ms. Cruzan's continued exist-
ence, and thus pursued what some may view as the morally correct course, "[i]t is harder to
morally justify letting somebody die a slow and ugly death, dehumanized, than it is to justify
helping him to escape from such misery." Fletcher, Ethics and Euthanasia, in DEATH, DY-
ING, AND EUTHANASIA 293 (1977).
29. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853. Quality of life, however, is perhaps the crux of the argu-
ment. The summary dismissal of a quality-of-life inquiry ignores the reason for the termina-
tion of treatment: the complete absence and impossibility of any objective quality of life when
there is only the mere persistence of biological life. Moreover, while the focus for traditional
ethics has been the sanctity of life, a better course in the right-to-die context may be to pursue
a code of ethics of the quality of life. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 28, at 294. "Humanness is
understood as primarily rational, not physiological. This 'doctrine of man' puts the homo and
ratio before the vita. It holds that being human is more 'valuable' than being alive." Id. at
295.
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considered as a constitutionally protected interest. While the Court ac-
knowledged that the Missouri Supreme Court's "requirement of proof in this
case may have frustrated the effectuation of the not-fully-expressed desires of
Nancy Cruzan," it nonetheless admonished that the "Constitution does not
require general rules to work faultlessly."3 The Court stated that because
Ms. Cruzan's expressions of intent "did not deal in terms with withdrawal of
medical treatment or of hydration and nutrition," Missouri did not violate
her constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse treatment. 3'
Finally, the Court rejected the guardians' contention that Missouri was
required to accept the substituted judgment of Ms. Cruzan's close family
members.32 The Court held that the due process clause required only that
the State allow the patient to determine when to terminate treatment.33
While the decision of a family member may not be "ignoble," "there is no
automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily
be the same as the patient's would have been." 34
II.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor focused on the ability of a
competent person to appoint a surrogate decisionmaker to act in the event of
incompetence. After noting that the majority opinion did not decide
"whether a State must also give effect to the decisions of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker," she opined that "such a duty may well be constitutionally re-
quired to protect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment. '35 Justice O'Connor suggested that a state's refusal to consider
evidence of intent other than explicit oral or written instructions "may fre-
30. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
31. Id. at 2855. However, even when a person attempts specificity through expressed
written consent, there is no assurance that the intent will be effectuated. One commentator
suggests that the patient and the doctor may have different understandings of the words used.
Moreover, it is difficult to predict the precise circumstances of one's death, and, therefore, to
memorialize one's intent with sufficient specificity. Rouse, Does Autonomy Require Informed
and Specific Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment?, 5 ISSUEs L. & MED., 321, 328-33
(1989). One possibility would be to consult one's physician prior to and after drafting the
document and then seek the physician's involvement when the need to terminate medical treat-
ment arises.
32. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855. Cruzan's parents had argued that under the federal and
Missouri constitutions, the State was required to accept their substituted judgment for their
daughter. However, while the Court held that a state is not obligated to recognize the substi-
tuted judgment of anyone, this holding does not preclude a state legislature or court, interpret-
ing a state constitution, from adopting the substituted judgment doctrine.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2855-56.
35. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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quently fail to honor a patient's intent."36 The appointment of a surrogate
decisionmaker would avoid this problem.37 Finally, she reiterated that the
"more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding
incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the
States."3
In a separate concurring opinion which had the tone of a dissent, Justice
Scalia stated emphatically that the "federal courts have no business in this
field" because "it is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through their
elected representatives, whether that wish (to terminate treatment) will be
honored. ' 39 Equating a right to withdraw treatment with a right to commit
suicide," Justice Scalia remarked that "'there is no significant support for
the claim that a right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be
deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' ""
As the "power of the State to prohibit suicide is unquestionable,'42 a patient
could not terminate treatment.
III.
In a dissent joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan
provided an analytical framework which, upon application, demonstrated
36. Id.; cf. id. at 2875 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Too few people execute living wills or
equivalently formal directives for such an evidentiary rule to ensure adequately that the wishes
of incompetent persons' will be honored."). "Surveys show that the overwhelming majority of
Americans have not executed such written instructions." Id. at 2875 n.21 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 2857.
38. Id. at 2859 (citation omitted); cf. id. at 2851 ("State courts have available to them for
decision a number of sources-state constitutions, statutes, and common law-which are not
available to us.").
39. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 2863 ("The Constitution
has nothing to say about the subject.").
40. One commentator posits that the analogy to suicide is incorrect; rather, an individual
has an inherent right to enlightened self-determination which encompasses the right to die.
Smith, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely
Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 275, 381 (1989).
41. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2860 (quoting Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A
Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 100 (1985) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937))).
42. Id. at 2863. The suicide contemplated by Justice Scalia and the right to die contem-
plated by a person in Ms. Cruzan's position are two separate and conceptually different situa-
tions. When one attempts suicide under Justice Scalia's view, a person decides to end her
existence after assessing all that life has to offer and concluding that life has no inherent value
or meaningfulness. In contrast, a person such as Ms. Cruzan makes no assessment of the
objective value or meaningfulness of life. Rather, her physical condition completely precludes
any opportunity to achieve or inject meaningfulness. Since any quality of life is objectively
impossible, the decision to die does not comport with Justice Scalia's traditional conception of
suicide. See Smith, supra note 40, at 381.
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that the balance between Nancy Cruzan's interests and the State's interests
necessarily favored Ms. Cruzan. He found that Ms. Cruzan had a funda-
mental right to refuse medical treatment,43 believing that she was "entitled
to choose to die with dignity."" Justice Brennan examined the physical and
personal implications of Ms. Cruzan's condition and concluded that the
"State's general interest in life must accede to Nancy Cruzan's particularized
and intense interest in self-determination in her choice of medical
treatment."
4 5
While recognizing that Missouri, as parens patriae, had a legitimate state
interest in Ms. Cruzan's welfare,46 Justice Brennan refused to recognize that
this interest included a generalized interest in the protection of life. For
Justice Brennan, the state could assert only an "interest in safeguarding the
accuracy of [the] determination" of Ms. Cruzan's intent "until [her] wishes
have been determined." '47 Consequently, any safeguards a state adopts must
enhance accuracy.4 A court then must determine "whether the incompe-
tent person would choose to live in a persistent vegetative state on life-sup-
port or to avoid this medical treatment. 4 9
Missouiri's evidentiary standards, though, failed to promote accuracy in
the determination of Ms. Cruzan's intent and thus deprived her of her right
to refuse medical treatment. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's
43. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 2864.
45. Id. at 2870. Justice Brennan suggested that the majority's view may actually deter the
use of life-sustaining treatment by medical personnel.
'[A]n even more troubling wrong occurs when a treatment that might save life or
improve liealth is not started because the health care personnel are afraid that they
will find it very difficult to stop the treatment if, as is fairly likely, it proves to be of
little benefit and greatly burdens the patient.'
Id. (quoting 3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT 75 (1983)).
This view is shared by George Annas, the Utley Professor of Health Law at Boston Univer-
sity's School of Medical and Public Health and the Director of the Law, Medicine, and Ethics
Program. He believes that "[ilt's becoming very hard to terminate treatment on anyone in this
country. The Cruzan decision is having that horrible effect-of physicians starting to practice
law basically." Colburn, Another Chapter in the Case of Nancy Cruzan: Missouri Seeks to
Withdraw from Legal Case It Has Long Pursued, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1990, Health, at 7, col.
3.
46. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id. By focusing his analysis on accuracy, Justice Brennan accommodates a broader
approach to determining Ms. Cruzan's intent. Consequently, he avoids the presumption in
favor of continued treatment which detracts from the analytical soundness of the majority
approach.
49. Id.
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heightened standard as a "markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden," re-
quiring clear and convincing evidence of specific statements of intent to dis-
continue treatment, while demanding no evidence to demonstrate that a
patient wanted to continue medical treatment.5" Justice Brennan opined
that the decision to terminate treatment would not lack guarantees of trust-
worthiness because such a decision is ordinarily the result of a considered
determination "by at least one adult and more frequently several adults that
discontinuation of treatment is the patient's wish."'" Moreover, the addi-
tional safeguards accompanying the decision, namely, a non-ex parte pro-
ceeding with an appointed guardian ad litem, would assure a balancing of all
interests.52 Further, Justice Brennan argued that the attempt to promote
accuracy through application of a clear and convincing standard,53 though
ordinarily necessary "to protect an individual's exercise of a fundamental
right,"5 4 actually functioned "as an obstacle to the exercise of [Ms.
Cruzan's] fundamental right."5 5
Justice Brennan offered a sound and flexible framework to assess the con-
stitutionality of any future procedural safeguards that determine an incom-
petent patient's intent. "[P]rotections must be genuinely aimed at ensuring
decisions commensurate with the will of the patient, and must be reliable as
instruments to that end." 5 6 Moreover, he noted that a state's goal to deter-
mine accurately an incompetent patient's intent is not hindered because
there is "nothing in the Constitution [that] prevents States from reviewing
the advisability of a family decision, by requiring a court proceeding or by
appointing an impartial guardian ad litem.",
57
Finally, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's position that a state
as parens patriae should determine whether treatment will continue when
the incompetent patient's intent cannot be ascertained.5" A state may select
the individual who the incompetent would most likely select, or it may re-
pose the decision in a family member; however, a state's inability to ascertain
intent does not justify its appropriation of that decision. Justice Brennan's
50. Id.
51. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2872 (1990).
52. Id. Family members, friends, doctors, and the guardian ad litem agreed that there
was no genuine dispute as to Ms. Cruzan's preference. Id. More specifically, Ms. Cruzan's
sister, mother, and two friends testified that Ms. Cruzan would want to discontinue the nutri-
tion and hydration. Id. at 2874 n.20.
53. Id. at 2872-73.
54. Id. at 2873.
55. Id. See generally G. SMITH, FINAL CHOICES: AUTONOMY IN HEALTH CARE DECI-
SIONS (1989).
56. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2877.
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response to Missouri's appropriation was in the form of a question: "Is there
any reason to suppose that a State is more likely to make the choice that the
patient would have made than someone who knew the patient intimately?" 9
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens opined that the Constitution required
the "State to care for Nancy Cruzan's life in a way that gives appropriate
respect to her own best interests."'  He concluded that the "best interests of
the individual, especially when buttressed by the interests of all related third
parties, must prevail over any general state policy that simply ignores those
interests., 6' As Missouri had only an "abstract, undifferentiated interest in
the preservation of life,"'62 Ms. Cruzan's best interests would allow a deci-
sion to terminate nutrition and hydration.
In addition, Justice Stevens attempted to distill Missouri's purpose in op-
posing the parent's request to remove the gastrostomy tube. After finding
that Missouri's objection unreasonably intruded upon Ms. Cruzan's liberty
interest,63 he interpreted Missouri's interest in the preservation of life as an
"effort to define life, rather than to protect it."'  Moreover, while the major-
ity declined to consider the quality of life under these circumstances, Justice
Stevens reasoned that "[1]ives do not exist in abstraction from persons, and
to pretend otherwise is not to honor but to desecrate the State's responsibil-
ity for protecting life."' 65 Thus, Ms. Cruzan's best interests overcame the
59. Id. (emphasis in original).
60. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2879 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the "best interests"
test has been applied most often to initiate treatment, Robertson, Is 'Substituted Judgment' a
Valid Legal Concept?, 5 ISSUEs L. & MED. 197, 200 n.ll (1989), and has favored continued
treatment as protecting a ward's best interests. Id. at 199-200; see Harris & Bostrom, Is the
Continued Provision of Foodand Fluids in Nancy Cruzan's Best Interests?, 5 IssuEs L. & MED.
415, 416 (1990) (concluding that continued provision of food and water are in her best
interests).
61. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2889 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989), however, criti-
cized the best interests test because "it lets another make a determination of a patient's quality
of life, thereby undermining the foundation of self-determination and inviolability of the per-
son upon which the right to refuse medical treatment stands." Id. at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
The better approach may be for a court to exercise substituted judgment for a patient.
While best interests may ignore the patient's subjective desires, as well as the particular cir-
cumstances surrounding her condition, substituted judgment focuses on what the patient her-
self would decide and thus would ensure an incompetent person the same guarantee of liberty
as a competent person. Liacos, Is 'Substituted Judgment' a Valid Legal Concept?, 5 IssuEs L.
& MED. 215, 220-21 (1989). By incorporating Justice Brennan's framework into the substi-
tuted judgment model, the result would avoid the presumption in favor of treatment while
supplying the inherent advantages of the judicial process.
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65. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2892. By allowing a state to argue that the protection of life
justifies the preclusion of a quality-of-life inquiry, there results "an illogical and pro-life blind-
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State's generalized interest, and thus should have prevented Missouri from
interfering with the decision to terminate treatment.
IV.
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court
provided a patchwork quilt of possibilities without providing clear guidance
on the multi-faceted issue of an incompetent patient's right to die.66 While
the majority's cursory refusal to assess a patient's quality of life was an un-
satisfactory response to the central issue for many in this legal-medical-ethi-
cal debate, it is conceivable that the Court feared a presumption in favor of
termination, a result that may occur if quality of life is considered.
Nevertheless, Cruzan marks the first time a majority of the Supreme
Court has recognized a right to die.67 This recognition will hopefully be a
springboard for future decisions to expand that right while including a qual-
ity-of-life component to its application.6" Justice Brennan provides a foun-
dation that avoids the creation of a presumption in favor of continued
treatment. His pursuit of accuracy is the most likely means to achieve what
an incompetent patient desired. Unfortunately, for patients like Nancy
Cruzan, accuracy is a goal for which there is no guarantee of realization, and
their only hope is either through state legislatures or for a natural death. In
light of the intensely political nature of the debate, the latter may be the
most likely-and expeditious-result.
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ness that subscribes to the shibboleth that where there is breath, there is 'life.' " Smith, supra
note 40, at 418.
66. "Disposition of the Cruzan case seems to have opened a Pandora's box of right-to-die
and right-to-life cases, all putting painful ethical dilemmas before the courts." Tifft, Life and
Death After Cruzan: Across the Country, a Welter of Painful Dilemmas About the Possible
Termination of Care Is Wending Through the Courts, TIME, Jan. 21, 1991, at 67 (surveying
factual situations).
67. See supra note 17.
68. Even with Justice Brennan's departure from the Court, one commentator believes that
"there is 'strong evidence' that a majority of the remaining justices either have rejected, or will
reject in future cases, (1) any distinction between the feeding tube and other forms of life
support, and (2) any distinction between 'dying' or 'terminally ill' patients and others whose
conditions have stabilized" and who could live for many years. See Law Conference, supra
note 7, at 2275 (paraphrasing address by Yale Kamisar).
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